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This work addressed efficient and effective implementation of honeypots (decoy devices) 
in cloud services.  Honeypots are essential tools for detecting new attacks on computers 
and networks, and cloud services are distributed processing systems that can be used to 
provide great flexibility in software deployment.  The particular subtype of honeypot we 
investigated was for industrial control systems (ICS) that manage electrical-power 
systems.  We started with two integrated software frameworks called Conpot and 
GridPot, and added new obfuscation techniques, new simulated features of a fake electric 
grid, and new interfaces that looked like real power-plant controls to increase their 
deceptive power.   These deceptions were effective in our first experiments with a 
standalone honeypot, as we were attacked twice by a sophisticated adversary as well as 
by many other less sophisticated attackers.  In our second experiments, not yet complete, 
we deployed the same honeypots at two cloud sites in the U.S. and in Asia.  We saw clear 
differences between all three deployments, showing that context is very important in 
deceiving attackers and collecting useful data about their attacks.  We were concerned 
deployment in the cloud could be detected by attackers and discourage their 
investigation, but we saw no evidence of that; apparently enough real electric-generation 
systems are deployed in the cloud today that they are not suspicious.  We conclude that 
honeypots for industrial control systems using cloud services are a useful tool for 
information security. 
 
Keywords: honeypots, cloud services, industrial control systems, power plant, electric 
grid, cyberattacks, deception, Conpot, GridPot, obfuscation, deception, adversaries  
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I. INTRODUCTION AND PREVIOUS WORK 
In recent years, critical-infrastructure systems have become increasingly complex, 
interdependent, and reliant on computerized industrial control systems (ICS) (Stouffer et 
al., 2015).  As our dependence on these control systems has grown, so has the frequency 
and complexity of cyberattacks conducted against them.  During the initial development 
of ICS systems from the 1950s, little attention was paid to identifying and managing risk 
from potential security flaws because the systems were not connected to large networks.  
This has changed (Hawk and Kaushiva, 2014).  However, ICS systems are often 
constructed with a planned lifetime of 20 to 30 years, meaning that legacy systems with 
well-known vulnerabilities will continue to be used for some time. 
 
This work studied electrical-grid systems in particular.  These have become major users 
of ICSs  to control power generation, transmission, and distribution.  While this has 
increased efficiency, it has also left power grids increasingly vulnerable to cyberattack.  
An example occurred in December 2015, when hackers believed to be linked to the 
Russian government used malware called CrashOverride to cut electrical power service 
to over 230,000 people in the Ukraine (SANS ICS, 2016).  Due to the inherent difficulties 
in securing the legacy systems used in many power systems, researchers are examining 
novel ways to enhance their security.  One such method is the deployment of honeypots 
(decoy devices). 
 
We have deployed honeypots for over 15 years at the Naval Postgraduate School (Rowe 
& Rrushi, 2016), and have derived much useful information about cyberattacks from 
them.  The technology for implementing them is increasingly mature, and a variety of 
deceptions can be used to make them more effective (Rowe, 2018).  In the past two years, 
we have explored honeypots for industrial-control systems, such as those in power plants.  
The Navy has many such systems in operation on ships, and also uses them ashore on 
bases similarly to civilian utilities, but they are especially vulnerable to cyberattacks 
because of the difficulty of updating their software.  Honeypots for these systems are also 
difficult to implement because they must simulate specialized processes like energy 
delivery, rather than well-known network communications methods as implemented by 
most honeypots. 
 
Cloud services would seem a good way to implement honeypots since many cyberattack 
campaigns choose targets and methods randomly, and having many targets permits seeing 
a more complete spectrum of attacks (Atadika, Burke, & Rowe, 2019).  Industries are 
increasingly using cloud services for supervisory control of manufacturing, power plants, 
and other industrial control systems.  However, they may not be convincing to 
cyberattackers because cloud usage for these purposes is relatively recent, and detection 
of the use of cloud services is often easy through identification of the owner of its 
Internet site, so many cyberattackers would be suspicious of sites in the cloud claiming to 
be industrial control systems.  At least in theory – so many cyberattacks are automated 
today that rarely do humans attackers inspect the characteristics of a site anymore.  The 
only reliable way to assess the suspiciousness of a cloud honeypot is to do experiments 
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with real cyberattackers.  Fortunately, cyberattackers need not be recruited, as putting any 
site up on the Internet usually attracts attackers within an hour, and at a higher rate for 
industrial control systems than for traditional computer systems (Hyun, 2018; Kendrick 






II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP 
A. ELECTRICAL GRIDS AND PROTOCOLS 
An electrical-power grid has four main functions: generation, transmission, distribution, 
and consumption (Blume, 2007).  Power is generated at plants from coal, natural gas, 
nuclear, or solar collection.  It is then transmitted from nearby electrical substations, at 
very high voltages until it reaches local distribution substations.  There power is stepped 
down to lower voltages and delivered over local transmission lines to individual 
consumers in homes, office buildings, or factories.  Typically, power is stepped down a 
final time just before delivery, minimizing losses in the distribution steps. 
  
We simulated the power grid through the IEEE 13-Node Model, originally developed by 
the Test Feeder Working Group under the Analytic Methods for Power Systems technical 
committee of the IEEE’s Power and Energy Society.  This is an old, relatively simple, 
and well-characterized model of distribution from a central step-down substation to local 
customers.  The advantages of using this model were that it was available in the open-
source power-grid simulator GridLAB-D (GridLAB-D, 2020), required relatively few 
computational resources, and offered a variety of electrical devices to simulate in a fairly 
realistic environment.  GridLAB-D was developed by Pacific Northwest Labs.   
 
 
Modern electrical-grid ICSs mostly use either the Distributed Network Protocol 3 
(DNP3), the IEC 60870-5 protocol, or the IEC 61850 protocol.  The IEC 60870-5 
standard assumes dedicated wired connections between devices, and thus does not route 
messages.  The IEC 60870-5-104 companion standard, commonly called IEC 104, 
extends IEC 60870-5 to include routing by the Transfer Control Protocol/Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol stack.  When the project began our plan was to handle control 
messaging with IEC 61850.  However, we later chose to use IEC 104 instead, because 
every device in a grid using IEC 61850 is described by a logical node (LN), which must 
be implemented for every device in the power grid.  The IEC 104 protocol is much less 
prescriptive than IEC 61850, eliminating configuration of the data model as a possible 
source of error.  Since our honeypot applications supported full IEC 104 messaging, we 
decided that it offered the best potential for simulating control messaging in our 
honeypot. 
 
B. ICS AND SCADA HONEYPOTS 
We wanted to create a honeypot that could imitate an ICS and attached Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, and was free of licensing issues.  Few 
such honeypots exist for ICS systems.  The honeypots we built in this research used two 
open-source software frameworks, Conpot (Antonioli et al., 2016) and GridPot 
(Redwood, 2016).  Conpot is a low-interaction honeypot, meaning that it has limited 
simulation capabilities, but it does implement the first few steps in many common 
communications protocols to catch initial connection and subversion attempts.  GridPot is 
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an extension of Conpot to provide more detailed interaction with attackers simulating 
electrical-power delivery systems, and uses GridLab-D.   
 
GridPot work in 2019 installed both of these, but we encountered many problems and got 
only a few weeks of data; yet we did seem to fool attackers (Rowe et al., 2020).  Overall, 
documentation and installation instructions were poor.  Many required packages for 
GridPot had not been updated since 2016, and we had to find upgrades that would work 
with Conpot without major changes to GridPot.  Once running, the Conpot portion did 
not impress attackers because of its limited simulation capabilities (Hyun, 2018).  
GridPot did more detailed simulation, but its implementation lacked parts for which we 
had to write our own code.  We added additional camouflage in the names used in 
Conpot and GridPot since default names are easy clues for identifying honeypots.   
 
Neither framework provided attackers with access to the physical devices of a power-grid 
ICS that we desired, so we added a Windows-based SCADA interface to the simulator, 
an open-source SCADA application that natively supports both IEC 104 and IEC 61850.  
With this application we could configure measurement and control points corresponding 
to the IEC 104 variables configured on Conpot, enabling receipt of updates and transmit 
commands to the virtual IEC 104 device running on Conpot.  The name of this 
application is withheld to prevent fingerprinting.  Although the project providing this 
application is open-source, we could not build from the available source code and had to 
rely on compiled binaries provided by the project maintainer.  These binaries work only 
on Windows, forcing us to use a Windows virtual machine to host the SCADA system.  
The project maintainer created these binaries by compiling source with Visual Studio 6.0, 
an obsolete version that is difficult to find or run on modern systems. 
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III. EXPERIMENTS 
Our experimentation had four phases.  In Phase 1 we ran a standalone honeypot 
implementation without the SCADA interface and collected useful attack data.  In Phase 
2, we enabled the SCADA interface and the hosting Windows system was attacked twice 
by a sophisticated intruder or intruders, and many (but not all) logs were erased 
(Dougherty, 2020).  One of the attacks witnessed an intruder trying to manufacture 
cryptocurrency.  Clearly the interface or the Windows environment necessary for it were 
insufficiently hardened for Internet access  In the third phase, we obtained a cloud 
account with DigitalOcean, and installed the same honeypot implementation, minus the 
SCADA interface, in a virtual machine (Bieker & Pilkington, 2020).   We obtained 
baseline data.  Then we obfuscated the honeypot and ran it at two sites, one in California 
and one in Asia, to test regional differences in attacks; the two instances will continue 
running until November. 
 
A. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Figure 1 shows our GridPot design.  The remote user sends an IEC 104 message directed 
to Conpot’s IEC 104 server, which calls a GridPot simulator method that passes the 
command to the associated GridPot information object.  The GridPot simulator then uses 
the corresponding method to translate the IEC 104 command into an HTTP request and 
pass it to the GridPot HTTP server, from where it is passed to the GridLAB-D simulation 
which makes the change.  The next time the GridPot simulator tells that GridPot object to 
poll its variables, the object passes that new value to the simulator, which notices the 
change.  The simulator then informs the IEC 104 server of the available update, 




Figure 1: Phase 1 honeypot design. 
 
Phase 2 added another deception in a SCADA station with graphical user interface to the 
honeypot (Figure 2).  Users could connect to a virtual machine running our open-source 
SCADA application on a Windows operating system through Microsoft’s Remote 
Desktop Protocol.  That virtual machine communicated with a backend Linux virtual 
machine running the Phase 1 GridPot.  The backend system provided realistic feedback to 
the SCADA application on the Windows virtual machine.  The desktop transmits the 
user’s keystrokes and mouse clicks to the interface software, which translates them into 
IEC 104 messages and sends them over a virtual network to the Phase 1 GridPot running 
on the Linux virtual machine.  This means that if the remote user captures packets on the 
Windows host’s inward-facing virtual network interface controller, they will see only 
IEC 104 traffic of the types expected between a real SCADA control station and its 
associated IEC 104 server.  Once the traffic reaches GridPot’s IEC 104 server, it is 
processed identically to IEC 104 traffic in Phase 1.  When the IEC 104 server sends its 
packet containing updates to the information object, the packet goes back over the virtual 
network to the SCADA interface software, which processes it and presents the results to 
the remote user.  The changes in the graphical view are then transmitted back to the 




Figure 2: Phase 1 honeypot design. 
 
B. MODIFICATIONS TO CONPOT IEC 104 SERVER 
We added to Conpot the capability to optionally label IEC 104 information object 
addresses (IOAs) defined in the server’s template as either “GridPot” or “Python” 
variables.  “GridPot” variables map to a value in the GridLAB-D simulation.  If the 
corresponding GridLAB-D value has changed when polled by its corresponding GridPot 
object, the change is automatically routed through the GridPot simulator to the IEC 104 
server where the data is updated.  Similarly, any commands sent to an IEC 104 command 
object are automatically passed to the GridPot simulator and on to GridLAB-D.   
“Python” variables, by contrast, map to variables in a GridPot object, not to variables in 
the GridLAB-D simulation.  These variables are not polled by the simulator because they 
can only change from user commands.  For example, a GridPot switch might have an 
"enable" command that must be set to True before the position of the switch can be 
changed. 
 
Second, we modified the Conpot IEC 104 server to accept certain types of incoming 
commands not handled by the original GridPot, and to pass their values to the GridPot 
simulator for action if their IOAs mentioned GridPot or Python variables.  We modified 
existing code for handling IEC 104 type-45 (set single-point Boolean), type-46 (set 
double-point Boolean), type-49 (set scaled value), and type-100 (general interrogation) 
commands to let them interface without requiring a SCADA application, and added the 
capability to handle type-63 (set floating-point value with time tag) commands as well.  
We chose to handle type-63 commands rather than modify the existing code for type-50 
(set floating point) commands because our SCADA application sent type-63 commands 
when the user issued commands with floating-point numbers. 
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Third, in Phase 2, we enabled the Conpot IEC 104 server to send data updates to a remote 
user without prompting.  When a remote socket interrogates an IEC 104 server, its 
session is now marked as "active" until the remote socket disconnects or times out.  
While a session is active, the GridPot simulator will continue to poll the objects it 
controls (such as switches) for changes to their variables, and will pass these changes to 
the IEC 104 server as with Phase 1.  If the IEC 104 server receives updates, it generates 
packets with the new values, labels them as spontaneous updates, and sends them to the 
remote socket.  When no active sessions remain, the IEC 104 server tells the GridPot 
simulator to stop polling its virtual devices.   
 
Fourth, to aid handling of updates, we changed the IEC 104 server to provide a pointer to 
its “update handler” to the GridPot simulator using the Conpot data bus, and accept a 
pointer to the simulator’s update handler in return.  When the IEC 104 server has 
completed startup, it pushes a pointer to its update handler onto the Conpot data bus and 
reads the pointer to the simulator’s update handler previously pushed during the 
simulator's startup.  While in theory this might cause a crash if the server tries to retrieve 
a nonexistent pointer, testing showed this was not a problem.  Once the server has a 
pointer to the simulator, it uses that pointer to call a simulator method that prompts the 
simulator to read the pointer the server just pushed to the data bus.  Since both server and 
simulator have pointers to each other, they can communicate by calling each other's 
methods. 
 
Finally, we changed the IEC 104 server to communicate with our SCADA application.  
Although not required for Phase 1, we implemented it to test it with the other IEC 104 
server changes.  IEC 104 specifies that to change a variable, the remote station must send 
an "activation" command, to which the server responds with an "activation confirmation" 
message.  The user then sends a command which causes the server to change the variable 
and send back both an I-frame with the updated value and an "activation termination" 
message for the variable.  By default, the Conpot IEC 104 server receives the command, 
changes the variable, sends back the updated value, then sends the activation termination 
message.  However, our SCADA application expects the updated value to come after the 
activation termination message and will not listen for it until the termination message has 
been received.  Since we could not determine which behavior was correct, we added a 
Boolean variable in the simulator allowing the GridPot user to choose at startup whether 
to use the default Conpot sequencing or interface-compatible sequencing. 
 
C. MODIFICATIONS TO GRIDPOT SIMULATOR 
Our changes to the GL_obj class in GridPot substantially expanded its functionality.  We 
implemented methods for object variables not associated with the GridLAB-D 
simulation, similar to the "Python" variables implemented in the Conpot IEC 104 server.  
We also improved handling of variables by storing them as instances of a new class that 
stored mappings between IEC 104 IOA numbers and GridLAB-D or Python variables, 
and also contained methods for converting between the strings GridLAB-D uses to store 
data and IEC 104 values, including complex numbers.  These changes substantially 
reduced the amount of device-specific code required for each subclass of GL_obj, since 
the only code needed for each device was what differentiated its behavior from others.  
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For example, when a switch is told to close, the HTTP command must read 
"status=CLOSED2" instead of "status=CLOSED" for the variable to change in the 
GridLAB-D simulation.  Since this only applies to switches, sending "CLOSED2" 
instead of "CLOSED" is handled in the GL_switch class.  This let us add basic power 
meters as GridPot devices by instantiating the base GL_obj class without any device-
specific code. 
 
A major limitation in the original GridPot simulator was the lack of integration with 
power-grid control protocols.  Our changes to the GridPot simulator and our additions to 
the IEC 104 protocol server enabled the two to interact.  The GridPot simulator 
periodically polls its devices for updated values and orders the IEC 104 server to send 
updates as needed by calling methods within the server, with mechanisms in place to 
prevent multiple updates for a single IOA to be queued simultaneously.  Incoming IEC 
104 requests for information or commands are passed to the simulator by the server 
calling its methods, with requests or commands being passed on by the simulator to 
individual objects and results being sent back.  Since our changes to the GridPot 
simulator made it slower, we changed its architecture to try to improve its efficiency.  We 
had the simulator poll its GridPot objects only when the IEC 104 server confirms an 
active connection.  We also allowed the simulator to use multiple processors.   
 
D. PHASE 2 IMPLEMENTATION 
Creating a realistic experience for an intruder to see involved configuring a SCADA 
application and designing a realistic user interface within that application.  Our SCADA 
application ran on a Windows virtual machine.  We first created a virtual IEC 104 device 
and added it to the application’s list of supported devices, then created IOAs within that 
virtual device for each information and command object from GridPot we wished to 
make visible at the SCADA interface.  The SCADA application stores IOAs as integers, 
so we wrote code to convert IOAs from GridPot's format to integers. 
 
We did not simulate the full IEEE 13-Node Model because testing showed it slowed 
GridPot's operation unacceptably.  Instead, the Phase 1 configuration used a voltage 
regulator, a switch, and seven power meters for residential customers.  We created two 
main displays within our SCADA application.  The first display reported the state of all 
simulated devices in the system; the second showed the status of one specific simulated 
device, and allowed the intruder to send commands to it.  The SCADA host's 
configuration enabled access to the system by the remote desktop Guest account, which 
by default lacks a password and is a popular target for attack (Boddy, Jones, and 
Stockley, 2019).  Providing an account without a password did require several changes to 
the local machine’s security policy and to Windows firewall rules. 
 
E. PHASE 1 DEPLOYMENT   
Phase 1 was deployed as a standalone honeypot.  We used two environments for this 
experiment, a development environment and a live environment.  The host for the live 
honeypot was a Dell XPS 8910 desktop computer with an Intel 3.40 GHz quad-core 
CPU, 16 gigabytes memory, and a 925 gigabyte hard disk running the Windows 10 Home 
operating system.  The live honeypot host was connected to the Internet by an ISP outside 
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our School's firewall.  However, the IP address is part of a block belonging to our 
institution, something that may have discouraged more sophisticated attackers. 
 
We ran the honeypot as a virtual machine under VirtualBox 5.2.22 with two virtual CPU 
cores, 10,240 megabytes memory, and 50 gigabytes of storage in a virtual disk.  The live-
honeypot machine had a bridged adapter, and used the same hardware (MAC) address as 
that of the host machine’s network-interface controller through which the virtual machine 
was bridged.  The controller's IP address, subnet, and gateway were manually configured 
to match the host machine's configuration.  This allowed Conpot to record the remote IP 
addresses connecting with its open ports. 
1. Data Collection 
Data was collected for Phase 1 between January 28th and May 14th and between June 
17th and August 2nd of 2020.  The Phase 1 GridPot, configured as described above, 
connected to public-facing external network and was left for Internet users to discover.  
Other than conducting a SHODAN scan and HoneyScore evaluation of the honeypot’s IP 
address early in the first run, we did not publicize the honeypot's address or try to draw 
attention to it in any way.   
 
We collected data in two ways.  The first was with Wireshark, a network-protocol 
analyzer that captured incoming packets on GridPot's connection to the Internet.  To keep 
the packet capture (PCAP) files to a manageable size, we only recorded packets for the 
two services provided by GridPot, HTTP (TCP port 80) and IEC 104 (TCP port 2404).  
We lost four days of Wireshark data when it was mistakenly set to capture on the wrong 
network interface, and ten days due to a power outage.  We wrote a Python program 
using to generate IEC 104 packets from Conpot log data for periods in which we lacked 
PCAP data.   
 
Our second data source was Conpot logs, specifically its text logger.  These logs are 
continuously written to disk, so they gave information for periods in which we lost PCAP 
data.  We had more trouble with Conpot data collection than with Wireshark collection;  
in some crashes, the logger would stop and suddenly output many events with timestamps 
corresponding to when it was stopped.  
2. Data Analysis 
Most analysis used the Python 3.6 Scapy packet handling library, and the Pandas data 
analysis library.  To consolidate the data , we wrote a Python program to parse PCAP 
files and Conpot log files for incoming HTTP and IEC 104 traffic, and record the 
timestamp, remote IP address, target TCP port, and HTTP method or IEC 104 frame type.  
For IEC 104 packets, the program determined whether they were simply directed to port 
2404 (called "traffic") or if they contained valid frames.  A valid frame was defined as a 
TCP segment directed to port 2404 with a payload starting with a byte value of 0x68 and 
a second byte correctly specifying the length of the message.   
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To investigate which IP addresses contacted the honeypot more than once, we wrote a 
Python program to count the number of sessions started by each IP address.  We defined 
a session as all packets exchanged by a socket pair on a given date 
.   
F. PHASE 2 DEPLOYMENT 
Our Phase 1 GridPot virtual machine was deployed on VirtualBox 5.2.22 with two virtual 
processors, 4096 megabytes of memory, and 50 gigabytes of storage.  One virtual 
network-interface controller attached to the machine, which was in turn attached to a 
VirtualBox internal network equipped with a DHCP server to allow communication with 
the Windows virtual machine hosting the SCADA application.  The latter had four virtual 
processors, 6052 megabytes of memory, and 40 gigabytes of storage.  It was equipped 
with two virtual network interface controllers: one attached to the same VirtualBox 
internal network as the Phase 1 GridPot virtual machine that provided communications 
with the GridPot virtual machine, and one a bridged adapter with its MAC address the 
same as the MAC address of the host machine network-interface controller that provided 
Internet connectivity.  Since the Windows host could not respond to HTTP traffic, this 
controller forwarded incoming traffic addressed to TCP port 80 to the internal network-
facing controller, and forwarded traffic from TCP port 80 on that controller back to the 
bridged adapter.  This allowed the GridPot HTTP server to respond to these requests.   
 
Data was collected for Phase 2 from May 26 to June 7 and from June 17 to June 29 in 
2020.  We analyzed three sources of data for Phase 1: PCAP packet captures, Conpot 
logs, and Windows event logs.  Packet captures and Conpot logs were collected from the 
outset, while the Windows event logs were added later.  We deployed Wireshark on the 
Windows virtual machine to collect packets from the Internet-facing bridged adapter.  As 
with Phase 1, we collected packets to or from TCP ports 80 (HTTP) and 3389 (RDP).  
We did not collect data from port 2404 during this phase, since the Internet-facing virtual 
machine did not have that port open.  Wireshark saved its PCAP packet data every three 
hours.  After our data collection issues on our first deployment of Phase 1, we also ran 
Wireshark on the GridPot virtual machine.  This secondary source of data was less useful 
since all traffic to the GridPot machine passed through the Windows virtual machine, and 
thus lost the remote IP address.  Since the Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol is an 
encrypted protocol, we used the security tool Mimikatz to extract the Windows host's 
encryption keys, allowing Wireshark to capture and store remote desktop traffic in the 
clear.  Conpot's text logger on the GridPot host was secondary data source, although it 
too could not record the remote IP originating the traffic. 
 
We gathered the following logs for each live run: 
 
• Windows System 
• Windows Security 
• Windows Firewall 
• Microsoft-Windows-Terminal Services-LocalSessionManager 
 14 
• Microsoft-Windows-Terminal Services- RemoteConnectionManager 
• Microsoft-Windows-User Profile Service- Operational 
• Microsoft-Windows-WindowsDefender-Operational 
• Microsoft-Windows-User Profile Service-Operational 
 
G. PHASES 3 AND 4 
For Phases 3 and 4 we used the cloud provider DigitalOcean.  We did not use our school-
endorsed provider, Amazon Web Services, because it did not allow for installation of 
honeypots for security reasons, and it was more expensive.  We installed the same 
honeypot setup with Conpot and GridPot used in Phase 1 without the SCADA interface 
because of the problems we had with it (Bieker & Pilkington, 2020).   It was installed in a 
virtual machine to enable easier portability.  We first obtained baseline data, then  
additionally obfuscated the honeypot and ran it at two sites, one in California and one in 
Asia, to test regional differences in attacks.  The testing is currently incomplete and will 




A. PHASE 1 
The Shodan Honeyscore evaluation of our live Phase 1 GridPot said it found a 0% 
probability of Phase 1 GridPot being a honeypot.  A score of 1.0 (or 100% probability of 
being a honeypot) was received by the previous version of GridPot (Rowe et al, 2020), 
indicating that our version is substantially better at evading a commonly used automated 
honeypot detection tool.  We also used the Shodan application programming interface to 
request information on our deployed GridPot as well as on the host on which the older 
version of GridPot was deployed.  Shodan did not identify it as a honeypot regardless of 
whether or not the IP's history was considered.  We conclude that our version of GridPot 
is better at evading this Shodan-based detection mechanism. 
 
Phase 1’s first run lasted 111 days and recorded traffic from 2,276 unique IP addresses 
from 121 countries; its second run lasted 46 days and recorded traffic from 588 unique IP 
addresses from 67 countries.   
 
B. PHASE 2 
The first Phase 2 run began on 5/26/20 and had an indicator of compromise on 6/7/2020 
when we discovered a process called XMRig Miner using 100% of our CPU.  The 
screenshot of the Guest desktop is shown in Figure 18.  Further investigation established 
that packet capture had been ended, leaving only a few entries from 5/26 that recorded 
some HTTP traffic and one TCP SYN scan of the remote desktop port; and that a third-
party software called Crack_by_NERO had been installed and used to password-lock the 
Guest desktop.  We also found a new folder on the Guest desktop called "xmrig-5.1.1," 
containing the XMRig Miner executable, which appeared to be a crypto-currency miner, 
the desktop locker executable, and a then-unidentified executable called 
"SpoolerComp.exe." The password locker achieved persistence by adding itself to the 
Windows Registry at HKEY_USERS/<Guest User ID>/Software/Microsoft/Windows/ 
CurrentVersion/Run, which specifies programs that run automatically on login. 
 
Our initial analysis of the first run concluded that the malware was installed in the 
Desktop folder because a Guest user had write access to it.  We therefore disabled Guest's 
write access to Desktop and other folders in their home directory, as well as setting our 
SCADA software to start at login to make it more apparent that the system was an ICS.  
Phase 1 second run started on 6/17/2020.  When we checked the honeypot on 6/29, we 
observed that packet capture was no longer running, the Windows preinstalled 
Administrator account was visible despite it being set to invisible at startup, a new 
Administrator level account called "Admin" had been created.  and a new executable 
called "opera_portable_56.0.3051.36.exe" had been downloaded to the C:\Program Files 
directory, as well as several executables labeled as Opera installers.   
  
We conclude that there were at least two penetrations of the system on 6/25.  The first 
exploit used the Admin account and installed the infected opera.exe file, but was 
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apparently thwarted by Windows Defender's anti-malware rules.  This attack probably 
originated from the IP address 88.209.137.9.  The second attack installed a different file 
in the same C:\ProgramData directory, which was again stopped by Windows Defender.  
Instead of giving up like the first time, someone or something deactivated Windows 
Defender and proceeded with the exploit.  Although log erasure means we cannot say for 
certain whether these two attacks were related, the use of the same type of malware in the 
same unauthorized C:\ProgramData directory suggests it. 
 
Because of the lack of data from Phase 2 and the possibility it was compromised, we did 
not include its data in the comparison that comprises the rest of this chapter. 
  
C. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PHASE 1 AND 3 
Phases 3 was done in the DigitalOcean cloud service.  Phase 3 tested a copy of the Phase 
1 setup without modification.  The Phase 4 honeypot used an additionally obfuscated 
version of the Phase 3 honeypot, which was installed on two sites, locally and in Asia.  
Phase 4 is not complete, so we confine our analysis here to Phase 3 and compare it to all 
the data from both runs of Phases 1. 
 
Preliminary results showed significantly more traffic on the cloud sites in Phase 3 than on 
the standalone non-cloud sites, so it is encouraging for intelligence gathering that 
attackers were not discouraged by the cloud implementation.  We also saw significant 
differences between the U.S. and Asia traffic, which suggest some security advantages of 
international cloud services.  These results confirm that cloud honeypots are feasible and 
effective for collecting intelligence on new cyberattacks on industrial control systems. 
 
Table 1 shows the testing periods, the number of unique IP addresses that contacted the 
honeypots, and the number of countries with which those addressed were registered. 
 
Table 1: Comparison of unique IP addresses and unique countries. 




Run 1: 111 days (1/28 – 
5/21/2020) 
Run 2: 46 days (7/5 – 8/2/2020) 
2864 188 
Phase 3 17 days (8/17/20 – 9/3/20) 542 67 
 
Figure 3 shows the proportions of single HTTP sessions (Remote IP addresses that had 
only connected to the honeypot for a single HTTP session, in red), multiple HTTP 
sessions without ICS protocols (in yellow), and remote IP addresses that had connected to 
the honeypot for more than one HTTP session (in green).  Here “Local” means Phase 1 
(combined Run 1 and Run 2) and “Cloud-1” means Phase 3.  Figure 1 shows the Phase 1 
GridPot had more HTTP traffic than the Phase 3 GridPot, for both single and multiple 
sessions.  It also shows that Phase 3 GridPot had more ICS traffic (shown as “Other”) 
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Figure 3: Percentage of IP addresses by number and type of session. 
Figure 4 breaks down the “Other” in Figure 3 into Single ICS Sessions (remote IP 
addresses that had only connected to the honeypot for a single ICS session), Multiple ICS 
Sessions without HTTP (remote IP addresses that had connected to the honeypot for 
more than one ICS session), and Both HTTP and ICS Sessions (remote IP addresses that 
had connected to the honeypot for both HTTP and ICS sessions).  Phase 1 handled more 
ICS-only sessions than Phase 3.  The number of IP addresses that connected to the HTTP 
and ICS servers in Phase 3 was significantly higher than the number of IP addresses that 
connected to them in Phase 1.  The cosine similarity between the Phase 1 and Phase 3 




Figure 4: Percentages of non-HTML traffic. 
Table 2 and Table 3 compare the number of requests made per session between IP 
addresses that only conducted a single session and IP addresses that conducted multiple 
sessions for HTTP and ICS, respectively.  The table also shows the means and standard 
deviations, which were applied to a two-tailed, two-sample T-test to determine whether 
the means significantly differ.  A p-value less than or equal to 0.05 is usually considered 
significant, indicating that there is a 5% probability that the variation between the two 
means could be random.  The p-values shown in Tables 2 and 3 indicate that there was a 
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statistically significant difference in the number of requests per session, with IP addresses 
contacting the honeypot multiple times making more requests per session than IP 
addresses that only connected to the honeypot once.  (Each p-value on Tables 2 and 3 
refers to the comparison between a set of single-session IP addresses and the 
corresponding set of multiple-session IP addresses; thus we only show one p-value per 
pair.) This suggests that most single-session IP addresses conducted relatively simple port 
scans, while IP addresses that connected multiple times are more likely to perform a 
detailed investigation of the open port.  The cosine similarity values of the comparison of 
the data between phases were 1.000 for single-session similarity and 0.689 for multiple-
session similarity for HTTP (Table 2), and 0.990 and 0.999 respectively for IEC 104 
(Table 3), so there were differences in the type of traffic. 
 
Table 2: Requests per session for HTTP. 














38.35 169.0 573 -- -- 








44.9 271.7 139 -- -- 
 
Table 3: Requests per session for ICS protocol IEC 104. 














15.42 13.15 38 -- -- 








7.68 5.50 19.4 -- -- 
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Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the inter-session times by protocol for phases 2 and 3.  Rapid 
sequences of session establishment from a single IP address might indicate scanning 
activity.  Most HTTP sessions occurred within 10 seconds or less on both honeypots.  
Phase 3 saw a large number of HTTP sessions occurring between 10 and 100 seconds, 
and a spike between 100,000 and 1,000,000 seconds; Phase 1 saw a spike between 10,000 
and 100,000 seconds.  For ICS sessions, most sessions occurred between 100,000 and 
1,000,00 seconds on Phase 3 whereas most sessions occurred within 10 seconds or less 
on Phase 1.  Phase 3 also saw a large number of ICS sessions occurring between 1,000 








Figure 6: Inter-session times for Phase 3. 
 
Table 4 shows the distribution of the most common countries of alleged source that 
visited Phase 1 and Phase 3 honeypots via HTTP.  For both implementations, ten 
countries contributed 2% or more of the total number of IP addresses, although the 
percentages of their contributions were different.  The cosine similarity of these country 




Table 4: Major source countries seen in the honeypots. 
Country Percentage in Phase 1 Percent in Phase 3 
United States 17.8 25.5 
Brazil 8.3 7.2 
China 8.0 9.2 
Russia 6.0 5.4 
India 3.3 4.2 
Germany 2.9 7.0 
Netherlands 2.3 4.8 





Figure 7 and Figure 8 show the logarithm of the number of incoming requests per day for 
both honeypots.  IEC 104 traffic means all traffic using IEC 104’s well-known TCP port 
(2404), and IEC 104 messages means only traffic with correctly formatted IEC 104 data.  
Phase 1 ran longer than Phase 3 and HTTP was observed on most days.  Phase 3 saw 
continuous HTTP and IEC 104 probing.  However, both phases saw gaps in IEC 104 
traffic with valid IEC 104 messages because of its low overall frequency.  For both 
phases, most traffic directed to the IEC 104 TCP port contained invalid messages, which 




Figure 7: Requests per day for Phase 1. 
 
 
Figure 8: Requests per day for Phase 3. 
Table 5 shows the counts of protocol requests per day.  The cosine similarity for HTTP, 
overall IEC 104 traffic, and IEC 104 traffic with valid IEC 104 messages were 0.997, 
0.759, and 0.992, respectively.   
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Phase 1 HTTP 239.7 413.9 
Phase 3 HTTP 376.9 704.0 
Phase 1 All IEC 104 traffic 10.5 27.7 
Phase 3 All IEC 104 traffic 10.4 2.7 
Phase 1 Valid IEC 104 traffic 2.3 1.7 
Phase 3 Valid IEC 104 traffic 2.4 1.7 
 
Table 6 summarizes the different HTTP methods that were attempted on the honeypots.  
The PROPFIND method is an HTTP extension for the Web Distributed Authoring and 
Versioning (WebDAV) application.  The cosine similarity of these distributions was 
0.779 so there were important differences. 
 
Table 6: HTTP methods seen. 
 POST GET CONNECT HEAD OPTIONS PROPFIND None 
Phase 1 13393 11651 76 66 31 3 1148 
Phase 3 992 5561 13 7 4 0 208 
 
 
Table 7 summarizes the different IEC 104 packets that were observed on the honeypots.   
 
Table 7: IEC 104 packets seen. 
 
 U Frame I Frame Malformed 
Phase 1 77 19 557 
Phase 3 13 4 171 
 
 
Phase 1 had 91% malformed messages, 6.9% U-frame messages, and 2.1% I-frame 
message; Phase 3 had 85.3% malformed messages, 11.8% U-frame messages, and 2.9% 




More experiments with cloud honeypots need to be conducted.  Since we observed 
regional differences, hundreds of honeypots could be set up all over the world and their 
outputs compared.  Cloud services make this much easier than setting up sites 
individually, and we saw no significant disadvantages to them, so they clearly should be 
the preferred implementation. 
 
Having more detailed simulation capabilities for industrial control systems definitely 
increased cyberattacker interest and the amount of activity on our honeypots, so 
simulation features should be enhanced.  However, a better SCADA interface is 
important because we were twice comprised.  We plan to run the SCADA interface on a 
Linux machine using a Windows API translator like Wine to avoid the vulnerabilities of 
the Microsoft environment. 
 
As for data analysis, more can be done to find new cyberattacks than we could do 
because there are a wide variety of methods we have not had time to try.   Being able to 
compare attacks across many different sites should make it easier to see past the 
randomization of many attacks.  After termination of this grant in October, three students 
will be continuing this work, including two students who graduate in December (Bieker 
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